30 November 2013

Federal plebiscite

Besides three main till now described branches of state power of a European federation, there are other that should in my opinion be present in the constitution of the European federation but I want to interrupt writing about them and to deal with something else now.

Most bodies that constitutions mention exercise (or at least should exercise) the people's will indirectly. It is possible to debate how much they really exercise the people's will and to what extent they only formally refer to it; it is however important that most state systems in Europe takes only very limitedly direct exercise of the people's will into account. From a point of view one could even say that the people in Europe grew mature not yet from the 19th century when modern society came into existence and that it is necessary that “experts” think and decide for the people. And it has to be remarked that what is called democracy has not substantially evolved since then to now, at most by spreading universal suffrage. Nothing is naturally black and white, the society of today is very complex and managing public affairs really needs experts. On the other hand, only in fairy tales political authorities work only for welfare of the people, in reality also the power is associated with state (or more broadly public) offices and it not rarely serves to interests of the powerful. It is not only a theory, political practice of European states (transferred also on the common European level) speaks expressively. In order that this is restricted as much as possible it is necessary that the people has a possibility to decide on itself without professional politicians acting as mediators. Also the people naturally can decide wrongly but in that case it takes consequences of its bad decision itself whereas a caste of professional politicians is protected from consequences of its bad decisions both by its high salaries and contacts above standard with the powerful and rich. So it is a question of fairness; in addition to that I wrote earlier that a European federation, from its very beginning, must be based on the will of the people expressed by itself, not – unlike in existing unification of Europe – on the will of politicians for which the people is only passive viewer of their decisions.

So I will write here about the way of decision-making which usually is called a referendum. I will call it in other way in my proposal, a plebiscite because I like this word more than the previous one. Moreover, it is also etymologically more suitable because translated from Latin it means “decision of the people” whereas there is nothing similar in a word referendum though someone can object that in ancient Rome the word “plebs” denoted not the entire people but only its part, the unprivileged people – but it is appropriate in a way of speaking because the privileged ones do not need plebiscites to press their interests. Because I will discuss a plebiscite within the European federation I will call it a federal plebiscite.

Now I will pursue basic parameters that a federal plebiscite in my opinion should have in the European federation. The first thing is obligatory character and a form that comes up from the plebiscite. A plebiscite (referendum) can be either consultative or mandatory. The first one has no place in my concept. The meaning of a plebiscite is that the people can get around the will of professional politicians by means of it and decide about itself. In that case a plebiscite that only would give a recommendation to political elites lacks any purpose (all the more so that it would waste resources). If I proceed from the assumption that the people should be a ruler and politicians should be only its servants, it cannot be allowed that the people beg its servants by a not binding inquiry of public opinion. It l however also logically follows from it which form the plebiscite has to have. In referendums of the present time it is usual that a question is submitted to the people and it responds with “yes” or “no”. But again, if I proceed from a condition that the people is a sovereign and politicians are its servants, it is not an acceptable way. The people decide whether yes or no but politicians have again a final decisions in their hands and they can handle the result – though within certain limits – in a way that the people's decision devalues and adapts to their interests (or interests of their sponsors). It is therefore necessary that the federal plebiscite in the European federation has such outcome which could not be changed by politicians in any way. The only way how to satisfy this condition is to propose a draft bill but made by citizens, not a parliament or a government. Citizens would so answer “yes” or “no” not to a question “Do you agree that it is done…?” but whether they agree with a proposed bill which then directly comes or comes not into force. It could be also possible to propose more bills regarding one matter and the citizens would elect the proposal which is the most acceptable for them. It certainly offers greater possibilities for the people to decide than a mere yes-no to a question about which concrete implementation into a law (or into actions of the executive power) it decides no more after. I consider also to be necessary that every international treaty is approved by the plebiscite, again not as an answer to a question “do you agree that the European Union makes a treaty with… dealing with…?” but in the form of approval or disapproval of the final wording of a negotiated treaty. International treaties, subsequently integrated into the system of law of the state, are usually very momentous, they not a little influence lives of people and sometimes unfortunately, they serve the powerful to press their interests in a way that tries to circumvent the people and democratic procedures belonging to it (as a typical example, one can remark events around an international treaty ACTA and continuing tries to sneakily smuggle some its principles despite a rejection in other treaties or a treaty about trade partnership between USA and EU being secretly negotiated in these days which is to radically reduce democratic supervision over supranational corporations). I have to highlight in conclusion that it is insufficient to me that citizens can only give their opinion to laws passed by the parliament as the thing is arranged in Switzerland. The citizens of the European federation must have a right to propose and to pass any law in a plebiscite without necessity to be approved by the federal parliament. It is worldwide unique (as I know, only in the USA in the level of (some) member states this happens) but the present crisis age requires new forms of democracy if the present ones fail.

The citizens of the European federation should have the right to express their will in a plebiscite whenever they consider appropriate but in some cases, to hold a plebiscite must be obligatory. First, it is ratification of the federal constitution and any its changes which I wrote in my earlier posts about, second, ratification of every law that expands the constitution with further provisions (such law is pointed out by words like “the law stipulates details”). Further it is ratification of an international treaty that was mentioned in the previous paragraph and also accession of the European federation to an international organization or a military pact – a reason is that by accession to such organization a state conform to interests of other states in a certain extent or – in the present world – rather of certain elites linked with states only loosely (trade organizations of today are a typical example). Another example of an obligatory plebiscite that I also wrote earlier about is admission of a new member of the federation and I add one case more, namely voting about status of a federal territory: I wrote earlier that federal territories unlike “full” member states should have a possibility to adapt their relation to the federation in a specific way but because their status should not be generally unified yet exceptional it is necessary to approve every such exception by all citizens; this voting is of the same kind as a plebiscite about admission of a new member because both give assent to a change of internal conditions in the federation.

Opponents of plebiscites (referendums) from ranks of politicians admit only sporadic use of them about questions which themselves propose to the people. Argumentation in principle is that the people is not enough mature or knowing to decide about itself and also that the people could initiate voting about some very important matter having significant influence on the entire society and after that adopt a very bad decision. It is offensive in a way, as if the people was small children that need leadership of adults, on the other hand, it is true that irrational emotions really could outweigh prudence. For example, there is a danger that in a crisis the people willingly votes for extraordinary powers for some “saviour” who will “make order”. It is obvious that a plebiscite (referendum) is really not possible about some matters because it would disturb the ground of democracy itself and the human rights. It is therefore necessary in the text of the European federation to outlaw a plebiscite about restriction of democratic order (for example in a form of extraordinary powers) and of the rights listed in the constitution, in particular in the case of prohibition of death penalty, torture, slavery and similarly. Also the people must restrict itself in some things, Cicero's “We are slaves of the law to be able to be free” has its value here in hundred percent.

Now, it is turn of practical questions of accomplishment of a federal plebiscite. The first thing is an initiative leading to it. It is clear from what I have written that it is not acceptable that citizens only ask for holding a plebiscite and politicians decide whether they comply or not. A plebiscite must be held every time when the people decides to decide a public matter through it, the question is only what number of citizens should be necessary to initiate a plebiscite. Practice in the only European state that can serve as an example, in Switzerland, is a guideline for me. In that state it is necessary to collect 50000 signatures of citizens so that a facultative referendum about laws (already passed by the parliament) is held. It is circa 0,63% of all inhabitants of Switzerland and my opinion is that there is no obstacle to use this share also in the European federation. Not all inhabitants however are also citizens entitled to vote, a number of citizens certainly is lower and in the constitution, a required number of initiators of a plebiscite has to be related just to citizens with the right to vote, not inhabitants generally. I will proceed from a condition that voters are 80% of state's inhabitants (so is the actual number in the Czech Republic) although it may vary by some percents up or down in various states. In the concrete case of above mentioned Switzerland, the number of 50000 signatures corresponds to a share of 0,78% of voters if I use that 80% voters of entire population. As the formulation of a concrete number in the text of the European constitution is concerned the problem is that it cannot be known at present how the European federation will look, namely how many inhabitants and voter it will have. In addition, it can be expected that it will be a growing state similarly like the USA in the 19th century. Therefore it cannot be possible to give an absolute number (though it would look better) and what is only left is to give a share, namely the mentioned 0,78% of voters. And the federal structure of the European Union has not be forgotten so there is again a condition of citizens' signatures from more member states – I chose more than six states as in other similar cases mentioned earlier because the thing here is of greater significance: so I decided for eight member states.

Realization of a federal plebiscite will be in hands of the executive power, that is of the Council of Chancellors. So, to announce a concrete date of voting will be its power. The date should not be too early in order that the citizens are able sufficiently to talk over a topic of voting but also not too late. The first is not so grave because already collection of signatures will procure attention to a topic of a potential plebiscite, voting must however not be deferred too much after necessary signatures are collected so as thus artificial lowering of citizens' interest in a topic of voting is not caused. If it is necessary to take account of necessity to technically prepare voting I consider the term of 200 days as a deadline.

I have another three general remarks to organization of the federal plebiscite. If some topics should be subjected to a mandatory plebiscite, it is useless to collect citizens' subscriptions to initiate it, only the initiative of the Council of Chancellors suffices in that case. I believe further that it is suitable that there is a possibility to propose any law passed in the federal parliament to the people to a binding statement on initiative of the Council of Chancellors. It would a kind of a parallel to a Swiss facultative referendum which essence is also emendation of parliament's measures but in this case, it would be rather means of controlling the legislative power by the executive power and the people. The last of three mentioned remarks refers to repeating the plebiscite. It is naturally not possible to eliminate from the public space forever a matter rejected in a federal plebiscite; it is however necessary as well to give sufficient space to the people to newly reconsider the thing if a demand to solve it via a plebiscite still endures. The term of three years after which voting will repeat is most suitable in my view.

Other provisions specifying conditions of holding the federal plebiscite are divided by me in two subsections in compliance with a topic of voting. In the first subsection there are provisions referring to the plebiscite about changes of the federal constitution, laws completing the federal constitution and ordinary laws. The first two matters are more significant than the third one and voting about them must be more strict. There are two ways that can be chosen – either higher number of signatures to initiate a plebiscite about these questions will be required or there will be a requirement on greater majority to approve. The Swiss example goes by first way, at voting on changes of the federal constitution it requires double subscriptions of the citizens than for voting on other matters but only a simple majority (over 50%) of involved voters is sufficient to approve an issue in both cases. The contrary seems to me more logical, namely the same number of requests for initiating a plebiscite whatever its issue should be but greater majority for approving changes and completion of the federal constitution. A concrete number of such higher majority is a question. I have written about a simple majority everywhere till now, only in the case of outvoting a veto of the Council of Chancellors in the Assembly of the Union I suggested a majority of 4/7 which is 57%. It is however little for deciding about a change of the federal constitution in my view, such important thing should require a majority of 2/3 of voters which is around 66%. I add in essence mechanically that also here (and in particular here) is necessary to lay down a dual majority for voting according to the Swiss example which is a majority of all voters and at the same time a majority of states which means a result of voting within individual states. At voting about ordinary bills, a simple majority of 50% (but again double) suffices for their approval in the plebiscite.

Some things more that I add are provisions referring to the relation of the federal plebiscite to the parliament or to making laws generally. Somebody can regard as an expression of basic decency that if the people approves a bill in the plebiscite, the federal parliament will not try to repeal or at least change it. But to rely only on decency in politics is not reasonable because there is also a question of power in politics so I consider to be appropriate to explicitly determine a limitation in the constitution saying that the Assembly of Union must not repeal or change a bill passed in the federal plebiscite and at the same time, I add one provision more: that in the Assembly of Union a bill including a matter rejected in the federal plebiscite must not be introduced for three years – the reason is obvious, again to prevent circumventing the will of the people and the period of three years is identical with the period for which it is not possible to vote about the same issue in the federal plebiscite. Another thing that I consider to be important to add determines some requisites of a law that is supposed to arise from the federal plebiscite. I described such requisites in the section about the Assembly of Union, in the paragraph prescribing a procedure of adopting laws. Those are requisites that have either considerable importance or their violation would cause serious malfunctions in legal order of the European federation and they must be valid every time, also if a law passed through a plebiscite is dealt with – a way of adopting a law cannot be of any importance. Namely, those are the provisions that forbid to adopt a law contradicting the federal constitution, to adopt a law with retrospective force, to include more unrelated matters in one law (or prohibition of so called riders though there is less danger that they will be approved in the plebiscite than in the parliament); then a law about proclamation of the war must contain a ground of proclamation, unambiguous identification of an enemy and an objective of military actions.

The second subsection of my proposal comprises provisions dealing with voting about international treaties. It is practical that politicians negotiate conditions of a treaty but it suffices not in my view that the treaty is then submitted to the people's voting only as is. The present time shows that politicians in secret calmly sell the people to the “markets” and in addition they publicly celebrate themselves for it. So I integrated a provision into my proposal that the people has a possibility to suggest changes in a treaty submitted to it to decide in a period of 200 days before the day of voting itself. It is a safety measure to avoid that some provision detrimental to the people is hidden in an otherwise beneficial treaty (an analogy to riders in bills passed by the parliament) and to avoid that politicians can blackmail the people with a statement that a beneficial or even needful treaty must not be rejected only due to one “problematic” provision. The appropriate number of citizens authorized to propose a change in the text of the submitted treaty is in my view 50000, however without a requirement of their distribution among more member states because I do not consider it to be necessary here. That is a matter of voting itself which is another provision of my proposal. The simple majority (again however double) should suffice to approve an international treaty because the international treaty equals an ordinary law by its importance, not a law changing the constitution.

I came to the conclusion that one more safety measure has to be added though it can be in a certain way taken as an expression of mistrust to abilities of the people to recognize what is harmful for itself. What I have in mind I explain straight in an example. In Europe, legal and social protection of people working in state of employment (through regulations of individual states) is still in force, such as limitation of working time, paid holiday, regulations of occupational safety, a minimal wage (though this no everywhere), health and old age security and so on. But if the European community concludes a free trade treaty with, let us assume, an Asian state where there is no similar protection of employees, actually a double collision occurs with the human rights as I articulated them earlier and which after all largely are in force today. If on the basis of this treaty, goods (or in certain cases services) produced by people in situation almost slavish (which is the reality of today) are imported in Europe such goods will necessary be cheaper than the same goods produced in Europe by people enjoying many social rights – it will result either to elimination of European jobs or to pressure to restriction of social right of European workers under the demand of so called competitiveness (and it is not uselessly pessimistic spooking, it is the reality of today again). In addition, such treaty in no way compels the other contracting party to improve social rights of its working people and Europe as a matter of fact makes out a blank cheque to continuation of insensate conditions at goods production in the country that the treaty concluded with – and it is in contradiction with the provision that the European federation should actively endeavour that human rights (including social right naturally) which acknowledges itself to diffuse in other parts of the world as I wrote in my proposal of the European federal constitution. If the future federal Europe should have conscience it cannot solemnly proclaim rights that will respect only home but at the same time, it will not only tolerate but on the contrary support their violation elsewhere and also indirectly allow that they are endangered at home. It is therefore obvious that an international treaty that seemingly has nothing to do with human rights and do not endanger them can in fact both endanger them and give sanction to their violation (abroad or home) and is therefore inconsistent with the constitution as I suggest it. By the way I add – which does directly not concern the suggestion of the European constitution – that the only moral and fair solution is to trade only with them who will respect human rights being in force in Europe but I am conscious that it is utopia in the present neo-liberal capitalism because trade agreements are formally concluded among states but in favour of supranational firms and more or less according to their requirements (because private profit is more important than human rights for them). In any case, it is necessary to think over again what federal Europe we actually want.

The last provision from the subsection dealing with plebiscites about international treaties speaks about accession of the European federation to international organizations including military (or “defense”) associations. These organizations have founding or other agreements regulating their action, they are however not enough detailed so as the joining state can say what in completeness it could expect from the organization and above all, where limits of its obligations towards it will be. Just the limits are concerned here. I added this provision again on the basis of a deterrent example of the present reality. When the Czech Republic in 1999 joined the NATO it was realized in the form of a law passed by the parliament. In the law, apart from poetic formulations, there was only the sentence that the Czech Republic joins the North Atlantic Treaty which text comprising 14 articles was cited; the law mentions no concrete obligations or rights. The Czech Republic (as well as some other east-European states) joined the NATO for (irrational but understandable) fear of Russia. But the army of the Czech Republic works in fact now as auxiliary colonial corps fighting outside Europe for interests of more mighty members of the NATO which has absolutely nothing to do with preparation of defense against Russia (or whomever else). In order that similar development is avoided at the European federation in the future and that it is not forced, by joining some organization (either trade or military or any other), to conform to principles that were not known in advance I deem necessary that accession of the European federation to any international organization, military or not military, has the form of an international treaty with concrete specification what are obligations of the federation to the organization and what rights following membership in the organization emerge from it.

14 October 2013

Federal judiciary - constitutional text

Chapter 3 – Judiciary
Article 44 – Federal judicial system
Judicial power of the European Union is vested in the Supreme Court of the Union, federal courts of first degree and federal courts of second degree.

Article 45 – Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the Union is a supreme judicial body of the Union. It has a seat in the Federal Region of Brussels.

Article 46 – Composition of the Supreme Court
1. The Supreme Court of the Union is composed of the President of the Supreme Court and 18 judges.
2. Every citizen of the Union who completed the age of 40 years and is not older than 70 years with at least 10 years of practice in law of the Union can be elected a judge of the Supreme Court.
3. The House of People of the Assembly of the Union elects six judges of the Supreme Court, the House of States elects six judges, the Council of Chancellors appoints six judges.
4. The term of service of a judge of the Supreme Court is 13 years.
5. Details are stipulated by the law.

Article 47 – Election of the President of the Supreme Court
1. The President of the Supreme Court is elected by citizens of the Union in general, direct and secret elections held in all territory of the Union at the same time and according to the same rules.
2. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of eighteen years has the right to elect the President of the Supreme Court.
3. Candidates for the President of the Supreme Court have to meet the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 46.
4. Every candidate has to prove itself with approval with his candidature of at least 50 000 citizens from at least three member states or other territories of the Union legitimate to vote to the House of People of the Assembly of the Union.
5. The candidate who obtains the majority of votes of citizens and at the same time the majority of votes of states is elected the President of the Supreme Court. Result of voting in the member state, the federal territory of the Union or the Federal Region of Brussels counts as the vote of state.
6. If no candidate is elected the procedure advances in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of article 37.
7. Details of the election are stipulated by the law.

Article 48 – Rights and duties of judges of the Supreme Court
1. Nobody is allowed to be a judge of the Supreme Court and to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity or of any other territory of the Union.
2. A judge of the Supreme Court is obliged to refrain from all action that could degrade his dignity and trust in impartiality and independence of the Supreme Court.
3. A judge of the Supreme Court may not be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a criminal act.
4. Judges of the Supreme Court receive a salary paid from means of the Union. To receive other remunerations is inadmissible.
5. The mandate of a judge of the Supreme Court becomes effective by his appointment. The mandate of the President of the Supreme Court becomes effective by his election.
6. Every judge of the Supreme Court takes the oath at his first attendance in the plenum. The oath of a judge of the Supreme Court reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to defend inviolability of rights of citizens of the Union emerging from nature of the man and from laws of the Union in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.”
7. The mandate of a judge of the Supreme Court expires by
(a) expiration of the term of mandate,
(b) refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations,
(c) resignation,
(d) death,
(e) exercise of an incompatible function,
(f) sentence for a deliberate offence.
8. The law stipulates details of rights and duties of judges of the Supreme Court.

Article 49 – Powers of the Supreme Court in first instance
The Supreme Court is a court in first instance for
a) controversies between the Union and the member states,
b) controversies between the Union and the associated states,
c) controversies between the member states,
d) controversies between components of the state power of the Union specified in this constitution,
e) considering conformity of laws of the Union, of decisions of the Council of Chancellors and of constitutions and laws of the member states and other territories of the Union with the constitution of the Union.

Article 50 – Other powers of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court further
a) is an appellate instance for federal courts of second degree,
b) hears constitutional complaints again violation of the rights given by the constitution of the Union,
c) hears disputes concerning jurisdiction between courts of the Union and courts of the member states and other territories of the Union.

Article 51 – Decision-making
1. The Supreme Courts decides in the plenum about the issues enumerated in article 49. At least 14 votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment.
2. The Supreme Court decides in collegia with three judges about the issues enumerated in article 50. At least two votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment. The President of the Supreme Court is not a part of any collegium.
3. Hearing cases is either non-public or public. The President of the Supreme Court decides about public hearing in the plenum, a president of a collegium decides about public hearing in a collegium unless the President of the Supreme Court decides otherwise.
4. Every judge is entitled to make proposals and obliged to vote for one of submitted proposals in the body in which he decides.
5. Judgments of the Supreme Court are pronounced publicly.
6. Every judge has the right to attach his dissenting opinion with justification to a judgment.
7. Details about proceedings in the Supreme Courts are stipulated by the law.

Article 52 – President of the Supreme Court
1. The President of the Supreme Court
a) represents the Supreme Court externally;
b) presides over sessions and voting of the plenum; opens discussions and voting; his vote has the weight of two votes; charges a concrete judge to write a decision after voting;
c) assigns judges to collegia and appoints presidents of collegia; a judge cannot be transferred to another collegium in the course of hearing a case;
d) draws up a work plan for the Supreme Court and its individual parts for a certain period not shorter than two weeks; he can at his discretion commit a case belonging to a collegium to a decision of the plenum;
e) performs administration of the Supreme Court, engages employees for that purpose and determines their job content; assistants of judges have to meet the condition of education in the sphere of law of the Union; the law stipulates details.
2. In his absence, the President of the Supreme Court charge another judge of the Supreme Court with exercising his powers except of the right to vote.
3. Unless otherwise stipulated all provisions referring to other judges of the Supreme Court apply to the President of the Supreme Court.

Article 53 – Federal courts of first degree
1. The federal courts of first degree are courts of first instance authorized for all issues emerging from law of the Union and activities of state administration authorities of the Union.
2. The law stipulates seats of federal courts of first degree, territorial districts of their jurisdiction and details about their work.
3. Every federal court of first degree has departments:
a) commercial for matters following from commercial and financial law,
b) civil and criminal law for matters following from civil procedure law, copyright and criminal law,
c) labour and social for matters following from labour and social law,
d) administrative for matters following from administrative law.
At least one judge is assigned to each department. Judges decide as single judges.
4. Judges of federal courts of first degree are elected by the House of People of the Assembly of the Union. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of 35 years with at least eight years of practice in law of the Union can be elected judge.
5. The provisions of article 48 apply to judges of federal courts of first degree.

Article 54 – Federal courts of second degree
1. The federal courts of second degree are appellate courts for matters heard at federal courts of first degree.
2. The law stipulates seats of federal courts of second degree, territorial districts of their jurisdiction and details about their work.
3. Every federal court of second degree has a department
a) commercial for matters following from commercial and financial law,
b) civil and criminal law for matters following from civil procedure law, copyright and criminal law,
c) labour and social for matters following from labour and social law,
d) administrative for matters following from administrative law.
At least three judges are assigned to each department. At least two votes of judges are necessary to pronounce a judgment.
4. Judges of federal courts of second degree are elected by the House of States of the Assembly of the Union. Every citizen of the Union who reached the age of 35 years with at least eight years of practice in law of the Union can be elected judge.
5. The provisions of article 48 apply to judges of federal courts of second degree.

30 September 2013

Lower federal courts

Whereas relevant constitutions usually write in details about a peak of the judicial system, existence of courts of lower degrees is often only briefly mentioned and all rules administering their function are pushed aside into ordinary laws. I do not want to expand on function of lower federal courts into the same details as about the Supreme Court in the proposal of the European federal constitution, yet the constitutional text should in my opinion determine at least the most elemental frame rules for the lower federal courts.

The principal judicial activity should take place at courts of the lowest degree, in other words at courts of first instance. Just at the first reference to them I face a question how the courts of first instance should be called (although it is not the most important thing). This degree of the judicial system is called district courts in the United States, which is a fitting name. I am however not inclined to rash copying, so I simply chose an appellation “federal courts of first degree”. Analogically, I gave the title of “federal courts of second degree” to the second level of the judicial system with appellate function (called courts of appeals in the United States).

As for a number of courts of the first and second degree, I cannot say anything concrete. Territorial extent of districts of respective courts and so also a number of inhabitants coming under jurisdiction of the respective court may be different and a total number of courts will depend on it. It is no other way but to leave it to an independent law.

I want also to leave rules about function of federal court of first and second degree to a different law but I regard as necessary that the constitution mentions their basic internal structure.  Because the federal courts of first degree should, according to my suggestion, deal with all affairs resulting from federal law it is necessary to reserve specialized judges or departments for certain spheres of affairs at each court. According to the competencies of the federation as suggested by me earlier, four departments at each federal court of first and second degree seem the most appropriate to me: a) commercial, b) civil and criminal, c) labour and social, d) administrative. Existence of some departments is understandable, a few words are necessary at some of them. There is not necessary to explain the commercial department for cases proceeding from commercial law as well as administrative department for matters of administrative law resulting from function of federal authorities. The labour and social department can awaken some questions, it is however based on that I left the labour law on federal level in the section about powers of the European federation and I determined co-operation of the federation and the member states in matters of health service and old age security in the social sphere ibidem. The most strange may seem why I assigned the civil and criminal department to every federal court. Who goes through powers of the federation that I described earlier finds out that matters coming under the civil and criminal law are not listed among competencies of the federation (that is they remain in competence of the member states). Yet there are some circumstances that force to use these spheres of law also on the federal level. As for criminal law, it is necessary to take criminal acts against authorities of the federation, property of the federation, currency of the federation and the like into account; after all, it is appropriate to remark that there is a federal criminal court in the Swiss federation. As far as civil law is concerned, some branches of it belonging under the power of the federation according to my suggestion are elements of it, namely it is a part of public law – civil procedure law (regulating actions at federal courts) and a part of private law – copyright law (other parts of intellectual property law would join commercial law and commercial departments of federal courts would apply them). There is unimportant to enumerate here other branches of law which can be applied in connection with powers of the European federation because they come under the Supreme Court of the federation in the first instance in my suggestion.

A thing of a number of judges assigned to individual departments and a number of judges adjudicating one thing naturally follows. It is usual that single judge decrees at courts of first instance which follows that every department of a federal court should have at least one judge. A federal court of the first degree so has to have at least four judges. It is however usual that judges decree in collegia (panels etc.) at appellate courts. If a number of three judges is wholly sufficient in one collegium, then every federal court of second degree would have at least twelve judges. A way of decision-making is in my suggestion this: through single judges at the courts of first degree, through collegia with three judges and with majority of two votes at the courts of second degree.

I did not mention a significant question yet who should appoint judges of federal courts of first and second degree. I entrusted appointment (election) to the Assembly of the Union (federal parliament) as in the case of the Supreme Court. Because the Assembly of the Union has two chambers in my suggestion, each of these chambers will vote judges of other level of the judicial system. Distribution of election between them is relatively simple – it can be assumed that a number of judges in the first degree will be greater due greater number of courts of this level in the judicial system than a number of appellate judges; therefore election of greater number of judges should be entrusted to greater of both chambers of the European federal parliament, namely the House of People and election of appellate judges thus remains at the House of States. Minimal requirements for judges is related to election of them. Unlike judges of the Supreme Court, lower age and shorter practice in federal law should suffice to judges of lower federal courts – namely a minimal age of 35 years and eight years of practice in Union's law.

Writing about the Supreme Court of the Union I did not mention delimitation of judge's mandate and his rights and duties. I believe that the same rules should be valid for all federal judges of the European Union regardless court level, so I write about them only now.

On principle, I took over the respective provisions concerning deputies of the Assembly of Union and members of the Council of Chancellors as I had them described earlier also for judges of federal courts making some smaller amendments or supplements required by substance of the thing. One provision was added by me in provisions about rights and duties which says that a judge is obliged to refrain from action that could debase his dignity or arouse doubts about impartiality of decision of the court of what he is a member. I modified also an oath of judges to a hearing: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to protect inviolability of rights of the people of the European Union arising from nature of the man and from laws of the Union in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.” I hope that it is evident that nature of the man is meant natural law. Then, I gave condemnation for a deliberate criminal offence, not only imprisonment as in the case of deputies of the federal parliament or members of the Council of Chancellors as one of conditions for termination of a judge's mandate.

21 August 2013

Powers and organization of the Supreme Court

I suggested already what functions the Supreme Court of the federation should have in an earlier post about overall form of the judicial system of the European federation, now I will synopticly summarize it, will deal also with organization of court's work and add powers of the president of the Supreme Court to it as I wrote above in the previous post.

Powers of the Supreme Court were basically given by me earlier, so I will namely put them into two groups; other will follow. The powers closely related to the constitution will be in the first group, namely resolving conflicts between the federation and the member states, conflicts among highest bodies of the federation's state power, also conflicts between the federation and the associated states (mentioned earlier), conflicts among the member states and finally adjudicating conformity of laws of the Union and of decrees of the Council of Chancellors as well as of constitutions, laws and other directives of the member states with the constitution of the Union.

The second group will include competencies following from position of the Supreme Court as a supreme member of the federal judicial system, namely hearing appeals from federal courts of second degree, constitutional complaints of citizens about violation of rights given by the constitution and also – which I have not mentioned earlier – conflicts about competency of court between the Union and the member states.

The mentioned division of the Supreme Court's competencies in two groups has its function not only in differentiation between constitutional and non-constitutional matters but also in a way of their hearing. The first group of matters – because of their significance – must be heard in the plenum of all 19 judges, collegia of three judges then suffice for matters of the second group. A question of majorities necessary to adopt a decision follows. It is simple at hearing cases in collegia – if there are three judges and unanimity is not required, votes of two judges are an only possible majority. I consider the same majority of two thirds of votes to be appropriate for a plenum vote (if the plenum hears more significant cases, why it should have a smaller majority?), that is concretely 14 votes (why not 13 I explain below). I do not suppose that it is necessary to determine a quorum, mentioned majorities should be valid in whatever number of present judges which means in practice the less judges are present the more unanimous their opinion must be.

There is another question whether proceedings should be public or non-public. I suppose that it is not necessary that they are public but I leave a decision to the judges themselves, concretely at the President of the Supreme Court when a case is heard in the plenum and at the chairman of a collegium if a case is heard in a collegium. To pronounce a verdict is however something else, it has to be pronounced publicly.

The last two provisions which I decided to insert in this section relate to a procedure of judges. According to the first of them, every judge has the right to suggest own proposal at hearing a case and then the obligation to vote for one of all suggested proposals – it makes to abstain from voting impossible. The second provision gives the right to attach their dissenting opinion to the judgment to the judges who disagree with a result of a voting; this should be valid for hearing cases either in the plenum and in collegia.

Now I move to provisions about the President of the Supreme Court. I wrote in the previous post that the President should be an only judge of the Supreme Court elected directly by citizens and his (her) exceptional position in the Supreme Court should be in accordance with it. Organizational powers are naturally above all the point; I tried to determine them in a way that the president has an influence on direction and decision-making of the court though he cannot get round voting of other judges.

That the president will represent the Supreme Court externally is self-evident so I immediately go over to other competencies and they concern hearing in the plenum. The president of the court should have the right to call a session of the plenum, to chair it, to open discussion and to vote as the first and to charge a concrete judge with writing a decision after voting. Because he should not be a member of any collegium he can vote only in the plenum. Here I asked myself a question whether to moderate discussion and to vote in the plenum is a sufficient possibility to influence the court's direction of opinion. Although I will mention more other administrative powers of the president of the court I reached the conclusion that it itself cannot be a sufficient expression of the president of the court's exceptionality against other judges and that I can dare to assign two votes to him at voting – it is not too exaggerated, the president alone this way cannot outvote other judges, it however symbolicly reflects that he unlike other judges was established in his office directly by the people. Then a majority of minimally 14 votes instead of 13 for pronouncing a judgment in the plenum follows from it as I have mentioned above.

Other competencies of the President of the Supreme Court relate to filling the collegia; he should have the right to place the judges to individual collegia and to determine their chairmen in my suggestion. I determined however one restriction so as the president of the court cannot arbitrarily manipulate with things being heard through transferring judges; this should be prevented with a provision that a judge cannot be transferred to another collegium in the time in which he considers a case but only after pronouncing a judgment. I also leave in the president's hands to determine a work plan of the plenum and the collegia, with a condition that it will not be for a period shorter than two weeks. I added one more to powers of the President of the Supreme Court over the collegia, namely a power at discretion to commit a case belonging to a collegium to plenum's hearing. The president's last administrative competence in my suggestion then is to manage ordinary operation of the Supreme Court, to engage employees and determine their job content; a condition was added by me here that employees assigned as judges' assistants must be educated in law of the Union (with detail stipulated by the law).

A question of temporary replacement of the President of the Supreme Court remains. There is no permanent Vice-President of the court in my proposal. By that reason, I added a provision that the president of the court can entrust anyone else judge with execution of his powers in the time of his absence but with one exception, namely the right to vote. As I have already written two votes of the President of the Supreme Court are expression of that he has unlike other judges direct support of citizens, no other judge should therefore have these two votes at his disposal. But there is a question whether the president of the court would schedule a plenum voting for a time of his absence.

I have no other special power for the president, so a statement remains that – except as above stated – all provisions concerning other judges (including matters about which I have not written yet) should relate to the court's president too.

Rules regulating election of the President of the Supreme Court naturally cannot be absent among other provisions concerning him (her). I believe that it is not necessary to invent anything new and that provisions regulating election of the Council of Chancellors (see here) should be used here, that is to say the majority system of two rounds with a requirement of double majority. The only two differences are in requirements for candidates and in number of citizens requisite to enroll a candidate. A candidate for the President of the Supreme Court has to meet criteria for other judges of this court, it is to say age of 40-70 years and activity in law of the Union of at least 10 years. As number of supporting citizens is concerned I decreased it against the corresponding number at election of the Council of Chancellors because experts of law discipline have smaller chance to obtain broader people's support than representatives of executive public functions. So my numbers are in this case 50 000 supporting citizens (a half of the number required to support  candidates for the Council of Chancellors) from at least three member states (or other members of the federation).

30 June 2013

Function of judges of the federal Supreme Court

In the previous post I presented my idea that a supreme court of the European federation should have the function of a constitutional court and at the same time a court of last resort on the top of the federal judicial system. Now I will deal with the concrete form of the court, namely with three questions – how many members (judges) the court should have, for how long time the judges should hold their function and in what way they should be installed in their functions.

I start with the size of the court. What number of judges would be the most suitable for the supreme court of the European federation? The court that I took as an example, the Supreme Court of the United States of America, has nine judges. Such number seems to me however low for purposes of the European federation, especially because a role of European constitutional courts is somewhat broader than the constitutional role of the Supreme Court of the USA. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland presents a wholly different number – it has 38 judges (in the present time). This number can seem surprisingly high in view of the size of Switzerland but it is due to the fact that there is not a fully developed federal judicial system of more degrees in Switzerland (the FSC was the only federal court for the long time). The Court of Justice of the European Union which can partially be compared to a constitutional court has 27 judges at present which is the number corresponding to the number of the member states of the community. The constitutional court of Russia has 19 judges which I regard as being in a reasonable range. The number of judges of the supreme court of the European federation must not be to high in order that the most important things can be heard in a plenary session (the number of 27 or even higher would be too high for that) but it must not be also too low in order that a sufficient number of collegia with lower number of judges to hear appeals from federal courts of lower degrees and to deal with constitutional complaints can be made. Finally, I came to the number 19, primarily on the basis of the number of collegia of the lower number of judges. If one of functions of the supreme court of the European federation should be to judge constitutional complaints that every citizen can file as it is common in practice of many European constitutional courts it can be expected that a number of such complaints will not be inconsiderable, so the number of collegia must correspond to it. For that reason I suggest to create six collegia and because the lowest reasonable number of judges of one collegium is three it makes together the resulting number 18. The president of the court should have a special position and should not participate in any collegium, he (she) should (in addition to other duties) only participate in plenary sessions and chair them. Nineteen judges may seem many for plenary decision making but similar numbers are known also from elsewhere (for example, the plenum of the constitutional court of Ukraine numbers 18 judges, the plenum of the supreme court of Finland as well); if we weigh up that nineteen persons can decide whether laws are constitutional that hundreds of millions people will be governed by, it is not a high number at all.

The second question is how long the judges of the supreme court of the European federation should hold their functions. There are two possibilities – lifetime tenure or for a determinate period of time. Appointment for lifetime naturally is also appointment for a limited period, only the period is not delimited in advance and usually is longer than terms determinate in advance. Nonetheless, judges in many states where appointed for lifetime have an obligation to retire after they have achieved a certain age and if a fact is added that a minimal limit of age of a candidate is determined is some states, appointment for lifetime in fact is appointment for a period that must not exceed some concrete number of years. It is better in that case right away to determine a determinate period equal for all judges which I prefer. And how long the period should be? It should represent balance between change and stability. Too long term of mandate of judges could result in enforcing outdated view at organization of society that accords not with changed societal reality, too short term of mandate on the other way could lead to frequent alterations of the Supreme Court's opinions and so to certain legal uncertainty in some measure. I take a period slightly exceeding 10 years for the best for the term of mandate of a judge of the supreme court of the European federation. I chose the term of 13 years, for that ground that the given number overlaps not with election cycle to the Assembly of the Union (4 years) and to the Council of Chancellors (5 years). A question is connected also with this number whether members of the supreme court should have the right to re-installation after their mandate has expired. I believe that it is not suitable, just due to length of the mandate: a mandate for twice 13 years or close to it in fact would be a lifetime mandate.

The last question remains, namely a way of installation of the judges of the supreme court of the European federation in their functions. I was hesitating here long before I decided for the solution. Because the supreme court (in the concept that I write here about) is one of three most important state bodies and if both the House of People of the Assembly of the Union and the Council of Chancellors are directly elected by citizens in my suggestion, I put a question to me whether the third of the most important state bodies should also be directly elected. Popular election of judges is not an unknown thing, it is under way for example in Switzerland in Europe (judges of lower courts), in the United States of America outside Europe (in state level, again mostly judges of lower courts but also of highest courts somewhere). So there are concrete experiences and there is also a long-lasting debate about advantages and disadvantages of popular vote of judges. It is stated as an advantage of popular vote that judges elected this way have greater responsibility to the people and have more respect to public sentiment or that direct election gives a legitimacy to the judges to be self-confident counterweight to other components of the state power; it is stated as an disadvantage that people are not able to consider quality of candidates and tend to choose according to partisan or secondary criteria or that directly elected judges can be influenced in their decision making by pressures of those who supported them in the election campaign (with money). Both kinds of arguments are weighty and do not facilitate a simple, prompt decision. There is an objection against popular vote of judges that it is purposeless because judges anyway must judge a thing by correct interpretation of law and there is no place for subjective beliefs in it. But it is not true; so why courts of highest levels judge in collegia (senates) and decide by voting if law can be applied only in sole way? I will introduce two examples of subjective (and most likely unconstitutional) decisions of the constitutional court of the Czech Republic which made me to ponder popular election of judges of the supreme court of the European federation.

In 2008, the right-wing government of the Czech Republic consisting of political parties loaded in favour of influential business groups and connected with them through corruption introduced (through the parliament) limitations (“ceilings”) on levies in the system of public pension and medical insurance for highest income groups (including great firms). These changes caused a loss in amount of (in conversion) 1,46 milliard euro in the public health system only in the first year of the respective law's force and the health system went further down in next years (the government called it a result of the global economic crisis). In order that the health system collapsed not the government introduced (through the parliament) charges for a visit to a doctor, for a hospital stay and extra charges to medicines to compensate the loss mentioned above (the official governmental justification was that people excessively use health care and waste medicines). It was in fact a transfer of (part of) tax duty from the richest to the middle classes and the poor (a typical neoliberal agenda known Europe-wide). The opposition termed it breaking the constitutional article which says that“ citizens shall have the right, on the basis of public insurance, to free medical care and to medical aids under conditions provided for by law”. Medical charges then came to the constitutional court which decided by close majority of votes that they are in conformity with the constitution. A core of its decision was that amount of the charges was not set so high that anybody would be kept from access to the public health care. The judgment even insinuated that free health care relates to the totalitarian communist regime (in which it really started – one of paradoxes of that age) as if it should be restricted in a democratic regime and acceptability of medical charges justified by reference to Hammurabi's code of law of ancient Babylon (!) that prescribed to pay for medical care as if no social progress could occur since than. The constitutional court itself thus by its own judgment (strangely justified in addition) authorized violation of the constitutional article which access to free medical care conditions only by paying public health insurance. In addition, the assertion of the court that amount of medical charges is no obstacle to access to health care proved to be untruth because the charges appreciably afflicted in particular old people who need health care in a higher degree and even mainstream mass media (which constantly uncritically favour whatever right-wing government and which after pronouncing the judgment predominantly exulted that the left-wing opposition succeeded not at the constitutional court) from time to time bring news about pensioners who reduce purchase of foodstuff to be able to afford medicine charges (that increase after their introduction which the constitutional court “could not” anticipate) or even visit not a doctor in the case of health inconveniences because they presume not to be able to afford to buy medicines that the doctor would prescribe to them. The constitutional court of the Czech republic gave another similar ruling recently. A right-wing government (other than in 2008 but corrupted even more) in 2012, in defiance of opinion of most citizens, pressed donation of public landed property in value of approximately 2,9 milliards euro to the catholic church with official substantiation that it is a remedy of injuries of the communist totalitarian regime (the public believes that it is only a pretext and that this property at least in part should be thieved by influential business groups connected to the government parties). The respective law (adopted by manipulating voting procedures in both chambers of the parliament and by bribing some deputies) came to the constitutional court which confirmed it as adopted in conformity with the constitution and not opposing it. One of the judges of the constitutional court attacked the decision of the court in his dissenting opinion writing that the constitutional court disregarded unlawfulness and immorality of the manner in which the respective law was pressed in the parliament, further the fact that the government conceals what concrete property should be given, that a principle of equality was violated because the catholic church should be more than abundantly compensated while others damaged in the age of the totalitarian regime received only small or even no restitution and that donation of immense property to the catholic church will appreciably raise its influence in the society which endangers religious neutrality of the state. The public feels this decision of the constitutional court unfair, there are voices that the constitutional court does not the job for which it was established.

Two mentioned examples of low-quality judgments of the court that should protect constitutional rights of the citizens but does it not can be attributed to low level of the society in the Czech Republic (as in other post-communist countries) but I believe that there can be a danger also in western Europe that courts guarding constitutionality may not put the proper accent to the rights of the citizens. From this point of view the argument supporting popular election of judges seems to me fully legitimate that says that judges elected this way will more observe interests of the people. In spite of it, I am not sure that it is possible to hold elections of 19 judges of the Supreme Court in a Europe-wide frame so that it has the effect that I have mentioned. After all, judges stand not in the main focus of mass media and it is more difficult to get information about all candidates for citizens in a wider European extent if no pan-European mass media exist. It would be also an organizational problem – how many candidates would have to run if 19 of them should be elected? Therefore I believe that especially in the very beginning of the European federation, it would be a problem to satisfactorily choose 19 judges by popular election so I decided for traditional appointment though I rejected the popular vote not entirely. In the end, there is one problem yet connected with appointment – namely whether appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court should be committed to the executive power with ratification of the legislative power as it is common in many states. The problem is that I wrote earlier that both chambers of the European federal parliament should be fully equal and it would follow from it that both chambers would have to deal with candidates proposed by the Council of Chancellors – and it would be complicated and lengthy. It would be also possible to use a joint session (as in Switzerland) but thus the principle of their equipollent status would be gone because of their different size. Finally I decided to divide appointment among three components of the state power – one third of judges appointed by the Council of Chancellors, one third by the House of the People and last third by the House of States. Altogether it is 18 judges and the last, just the president of the court would be chosen in mentioned popular election. Significance of the court's president (his/her competencies) should be in accordance to the fact that he, unlike other judges, was elected directly by the citizens, nevertheless I will get on to it in another post.

31 May 2013

Federal judiciary - general overview

It is left to me now to discuss the remaining component of the principal state powers of the European federation, the judicial power. Before I start describing (in the next post) concrete questions, it is necessary to think about a general form of the judicial power of the European federation. Two questions that are mutually connected have to be answered – how many courts and what types of courts should to execute the judicial power of the federation and what connection should be between the federal judiciary and courts of the member states. There are two choices in principle: either the European federation will have one supreme court whose content will be to resolve questions of jurisdiction between the federation and the member states and among supreme bodies of the federation (or possibly in addition to it several specialized courts, as for patent matters for example) and remaining disputable matters following from federal law will judge the member states courts (as in the present EU) or federal law will be interpreted and judged solely by a fully developed system of federal courts without participation of courts of the member states. Let us see first how the situation in (mainly) European federations looks.

I start with the greatest European federation, Germany. There are both courts of the member states and federal ones. There are six mutually equipollent courts on the top of the federal judicial system, the federal constitutional court and five courts for criminal, civil and patent, administrative, financial, social and labour matters. Save for the constitutional court these courts are the last appellate instance for courts of lower degrees. These lower courts are however not only federal courts but also courts of the states and so entire system of German courts is in fact interconnected in one complex. For example whatever criminal case initiated at state courts can in appellate procedure end at the Federal Court of Justice. It is for that reason that almost all important law passes the federation under concurrent legislation and state courts therefore in fact (predominantly) arbitrate according federal law. The state courts decide also state matters according to state law but its sphere is relatively narrow.

Situation in neighbouring Austria is very similar; the role of the federation there is fortified by the fact that entirely judicial system is only federal. On its top, there is the constitutional court and three specialized courts for criminal and civil, administrative matters and of asylum; there are no courts of the member states. These states (or provinces) have the right to pass own laws but in very narrow sphere like in Germany and federal courts so judge also questions coming out from modest law of states – it is actually wholly opposite to how applying law of the European Union works.

Situation in Belgium, another European federation, is basically similar to that one in Austria. All judicial system is only federal (though it is not called so) which is caused by the fact that it underwent not organizational change since when Belgium was a unitary state. There is naturally the Constitutional Court for the whole state, otherwise in the federal level the Court of Cassation as a supreme instance for extra-constitutional matters.

There is a separate state (cantonal) and federal judicial system in Swiss federation. The federal judiciary comprises of three courts, the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Administrative Court. Not all federal law is however judged only at these courts, some questions are judged according to federal law also by the state (cantonal) courts and vice versa the federal courts are an appellate instance for some matters coming under the state level (as matters of municipal autonomy). Generally however separation of state and federal judicial system in Switzerland is noticeably greater than in Germany.

A relation between federal and state judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar to the Swiss one. The federal judiciary comprises of three courts, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Authority of the constitutional court is clear and accord with that of constitutional courts of other federations; the last mentioned court is a local uniqueness responding to the war in former Yugoslavia. Competence of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina comes out from federal law and its content is to judge cases of organized crime and economic criminality if they go beyond the scope of the states (called entities here) or if they endanger integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or may cause economic damages exceeding boundaries of the states (entities); this court judges not appeals from state (entities) courts. It can be said that separation of judicial system of the federation and of the member states is the greatest in Bosnia and Herzegovina among all European federations.

Because the United States of America are strong inspiration for political unification of Europe I will present also the judicial system of the United States. The federal judicial system and courts of the member states are separate in the United States, they basically act according to different law (federal or of the respective state) in either this level in which this system is similar to that of Switzerland or Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the contrary dissimilar to Austrian, Belgian and in fact German one. But the federal judicial system in the United States is, unlike the federal judiciary in whatever European federation, extensive and has several degrees. The Supreme Court stands on the top of the judicial system and acts partly as a constitutional court, partly as a court of last resort with appellate jurisdiction over federal courts of lower degrees. The second degree is comprised partly of twelve appellate courts on geographic basis, partly of appellate courts for some special matters and, in the end, of an appellate court for the armed forces. The lowest degree of the federal courts is most large, district courts that are at least one in every member state fall here first of all, then four specialized courts for tax, economic questions and of foreign intelligence agents; moreover a bankruptcy court is affiliated to each district court and also courts of the armed forces complete the system of the lowest degree courts.

There is a question now which of the mentioned systems is most suitable for the European federation. First of all, it is necessary to answer whether interpretation of federal law should be committed to the member states courts – extent of the federal judicial system then will be dependent on it. There are two choices: 1) judicial proceeding in questions of federal law will be initiated at the member states courts (which will so function as intrastate courts following interstate law for one thing and as federal courts following federal law for another thing) and only possible appellate proceedings will take place at the courts of the federation; the most important constitutional questions will be heard exclusively at federal courts; 2) judicial proceedings in questions coming under federal law will in all degrees take place in the system of federal courts separate from judiciary of the member states. The first model is on principle a model of Germany and Austria and of the present European Union (which is logical because it – despite its name – is basically an international organization), the second model is in essence that of Switzerland, of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the United States of America. No inexorable logic of functioning of the federation as such requires one concrete solution, so the choice depends on subjective perception of relation between the federation and the member states or rather of position of the member states. It is about a conception whether the member states will take a share in exercising powers of the federation or whether they will exercise only their internal matters. My opinion is that activity of either level should be separate as much as possible; for each level has own sphere of functions and activities and should decide on them independently. Just distribution of public affairs between two levels is essence of the federation and if we wanted to leave execution of common affairs to the member states, we would have no need of a federation, an international organization like the present European Union would suffice. The federal level is established to exercise common affairs, it is its purpose – so let it do it. It is necessary to emphasize that common affairs (which are content of activity of the federal level) require uniform arrangement equal for all involved ones. To adopt uniform rules common for all in the federal level and then to exercise them differently according to nature of the respective member states in the state level makes no sense. If it is necessary to exercise a public affair according to conventions of a given state, that affair should fall in the state level, not in the federal one (some states can have a belief that they must absolutely all execute themselves according to own conventions and that therefore cannot accept any federation, but it is another question). Two reasons why to want to (partially) exercise powers of the federation by member states organs occur to me: 1) a state can have a strong tradition of efficient public administration and believe that it can better exercise decisions of the federation than the administration of the federation would do it; 2) fear of growth of bureaucracy by creating new (e.g. federal) authorities besides the existing state ones. But in the first case, desirable solution is to strive for high-quality federal administration, in the second case, it is necessary to realize that quantity of functions of state organs will decrease by creating the federal level, so doubling of organs for execution of the same matters will not occur. A rule should be in force in my opinion: in what level a decision was passed, in that level it should be executed. This should be generally valid, it means in the sphere of judiciary that exclusively a system of federal courts separate from state courts should interpret federal law.

A form of the judicial system of the European federation is thus predetermined in a large extent. A court holding a function of the constitutional court must naturally be on the top but it is about how the rest of the system will look. If we start with axiom of separate federal judiciary, the European federation cannot make do with for example three courts as in the Swiss case. Whereas Switzerland is relatively small (eight millions inhabitants) the European federation will probably comprise a significant part of Europe with great population some day (though it may start as a relatively small state comprising of only few member states). It will require a more extensive judicial system, like in the USA. Also the European federation in my opinion should have a system of three degrees, with courts of original jurisdiction, appellate courts in the second degree and a supreme court on the top of the system.

Questions are left to answer whether original and appellate judicial proceeding should take place only at ordinary courts of the first and second degree or whether some spheres of affairs should be judged at specialized courts in either this degree and in addition whether a separate constitutional court there should be on the top of the system or whether the constitutional authority should pertain to the supreme appellate court. If we look at specialized courts of the mentioned federations, we can see that they are not identical and so it looks that it depends on specific needs in the given federation. I am not able to say something about specific need of the future European federation and besides, I think that it is only organizational thing whether some matters of federal law will be judged by a general system or they will be separated to courts specialized in certain subjects. Therefore I believe that it will be more understandable for the public and more simple if all questions of federal law will be heard at general courts, each of them having several departments for separate spheres of matters.

As far as separation of a constitutional court is concerned I prefer that constitutional questions are heard by the supreme court as in the United States. Because it seems to me suitable that one court is on the top of the federal judicial system and functions as its keystone. All judicial system of the European federation would so have a form of a pyramid – courts of first degree with original jurisdiction at the bottom, appellate courts of the second degree over them and all on the top would be the supreme court. All this pyramid should be entirely separate from the member state courts and all matters coming under federal law should be judged only at the federal courts.

This is my general idea for now, next time I will deal with a form (composition) of the supreme court.

30 April 2013

Flag of the European federation

In one my previous post dealing with basic data about the European federation I described also state symbols of the European federal state. I took over symbols of the present intergovernmental European Union  without change or only with small changes because the symbols seemed well chosen to me and appropriate also for a future European federation. But I realized later that it will not be so simple. The symbols described by me in the relevant part of the suggested constitution of the European federal state should be connected with a future European federation but they are at the same time already today used as the symbols of the intergovernmental organization called the European Union. And it is just the problem. International organizations work primarily on the basis of governmental diplomacy, a federal state should be grounded on as directly as possible expressed will of its citizens themselves. The symbols of the present intergovernmental European Union so could be used only if the present international organization as its first stage would continuously pass to a federal state. It was indeed so planned in the beginning. Robert Schuman presented in his memorable speech in 1950 among other: The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe. In the first decades, all steps of the unification process certainly followed this final goal but I do not know whether it still stands. Politicians speak about “deepening of integration” but only expanding spheres of the topics that the governments of the member states deal in their “European” meetings with is a case in practice; progress towards true federal arrangement is not visible, not to speak about committing especially essential matters of all-European significance to the hands of the people. Decision making of the European Commission and the Council of the EU is a bit similar to the method of governance in east-European totalitarian states before 1990 – the ruling party organized a congress, a plan for following years adopted at it, the mass media obligatorily exalted it and the rest of the society got the task to apply the plan in its doings; there was a zero scope for activity and decisions of the people. Apart that the people can almost only watch decisions of the present EU, the EU authorities promote more and more such policy that injures citizens of the member states and alienates them from the whole organization. Trust in the present European Union rapidly falls, also in countries traditionally inclined towards unification of Europe.


For we have a crisis and it is necessary to placate the financial markets. Prosperity of banks is more important then lives of citizens and the European Union became an instrument of help for banks and great firms at the expense of citizens of the member states. Also common solidarity rapidly decays, a common objective in followed no more, every state acts almost only at its own; the mark of the European Union is left almost only for Germany that however by means of it also is in pursuit of its own aim, namely preserving of prosperity of the German economy, even at the cost of devastation of lives of other Europeans. I do not wonder at all that hate against the EU grows in Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Portugal and somewhere else where Germany shielded by the name of the EU comes to “cut”.


Especially the euro (currency) crisis shows considerable lack of democracy in the European organization because important economic (and social following them) questions were taken from the power of the member states where their citizens so so could influence them in the European level where they are outside reach of the citizens, especially those from the states that are mostly afflicted by the crisis. Organizations preceding the present European Union were established after the war as first degrees of Europe's unification but the current quasi union demonstrates rather an image of disintegration than unity. Generally, it can be said that the current intergovernmental organization of 27 European states discredit the idea of Europe's unification in minds of many Europeans and the same can be said about its symbols. Therefore I decided that a flag of the European federation that should already now represent the future federation should be different form the flag of the current European Union which ceases to be a symbol of a hope for the future; and just the flag is the most used of all symbols of the current EU, the most known and the most frequent target of dissent to the organization. Simply: let use of the present blue flag with yellow stars indicates only the current international organization (whose heading towards a democratic federation is extremely uncertain) and let use of the flag of the European federation symbolizes solely the European federation and unambiguous heading towards it.

So how should look the flag of the European federation? My first precondition is that the present flag symbolism of the international European Union should not be entirely rejected because some progress on the course towards Europe's unification on the federal basis was achieved also in the intergovernmental field. My second precondition nevertheless proceeds from the fact that explicit heading of the current European Union towards the federal state is unclear, its “leaders” (that is the national politicians) do not speak about it and some of them do everything so that it stays unchanged. Therefore I want to supplement the flag symbol of the present EU with a symbol unequivocally expressing heading to federal arrangement. The only symbol whose interpretation is undoubtedly such as this is according to my knowledge the symbol of Pan-Europa.

A symbol of the Pan-European movement constituted by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was slightly transforming during decades. It had only two colours initially, yellow and red arranged in the form of a red cross on a yellow circle. “A sign in which Europeans of all states connect together is a sun cross: a red cross on a golden sun, a symbol of humanity and sense.” (Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: Pan-Europa).


After having specified these two preconditions I was faced with a question how to combine the named two symbols in one. A first and most natural possibility is to maintain composition of both source symbols, that is the flag of the present EU and the original circular symbol of pan-European movement. Then it is natural to insert the yellow circle with the cross inside the ring of yellow stars in (dark) blue flag.


This symbol is however already in use, it is a current symbol of the pan-European movement.


But that is not only reason why this form not suits me; because it visually too resembles the flag of the current EU with all its mentioned above. I decided therefore to swap the colours in order that yellow prevails in the flag. In that case blue remains represented only in the form of a blue background under the circle of yellow stars (otherwise yellow stars would blend in with the yellow background of the flag). By simple swap of the blue colour for the yellow according to that told above with preservation of composition of the current pan-European movement's flag arises a flag as follows. I selected greater width so that the area of yellow comes to the fore.


This flag can however be further modified in the way that the limbs of the red cross are lengthened from outside the stars circle up to borders of the flag. The modified form actually adjusts the original circle-shaped symbol of Pan-Europa to rectangular shape of a flag whose all area it fills and the blue circle with yellow stars is added like in the previous variant.


In the just presented flag, the blue circle with yellow stars is optically on top and the red cross under it. This optical foreground and background (besides the yellow background of the whole flag itself) can be swapped so that the red cross is optically on top and the blue circle with stars is under it. Four stars however would so end up hidden under the cross, in that case they have to be depicted just in the cross, outside the blue circle.


No other composition crossed my mind, so it remains to select one of these variants now. I prefer from the three presented flags with prevailing yellow flag the two ones in which the red cross along with the yellow background fills the whole area of the flag; and that ground is then completed with yellow stars on a blue circle in two ways. I chose from these two variants only on the basis of an aesthetic impression which is, I admit, subjective. I like more the flag with the blue circle under the red cross; that four stars are outside the blue circle I hold not objectionable.

So the conclusion of my reflection is a flag of the European federal state in the form of a yellow field with a red cross in it and a circle of twelve yellow five-angled stars round the cross' center on a blue circle put under the cross' limbs.


21 April 2013

Council of Chancellors - constitutional text

Chapter 2 – Council of Chancellors
Article 36 – Executive power of the Union
1. The executive power of the Union, unless the federal plebiscite determines otherwise, is vested in the Council of Chancellors.
2. The Council of Chancellors comprises of the First Chancellor of the Union and two Chancellors of the Union. Their position is equal except in cases established by the constitution.

Article 37 – Election
1. The members of the Council of Chancellors are elected by the people of the European Union in  general, direct and secret elections.
2. The term of mandate of the Chancellor of the Union is five years. Nobody can be elected the Chancellor of the Union more than twice.
3. Every citizen of the European Union who reached the age of 18 years has the right to elect the Chancellor of the Union.
4. Every citizen of the European Union who completed the age of forty can be elected a Chancellor of the Union.
5. Candidates submit an announcement of their candidature in groups of three persons. Nobody in the respective group can be a citizen of the same member state or other territory of the Union as other members of the same group of candidates.
6. Each group of candidates has to prove itself with approval with its candidature of at least one hundred thousand citizens from at least one sixth of the member states or other territories of the Union legitimate to vote to the House of People of the Assembly of the Union.
7. Candidates of that group which obtains the majority of  votes of citizens and at the same time the majority of votes of states become Chancellors of the Union. Result of voting in the member state, the federal territory of the Union or the Federal Region of Brussels counts as the vote of state.
8. If no group of candidates is elected, the second round is held to which advance two groups of candidates with the highest total of votes of citizens and of portion of votes of states. The second round is held 15 days after the first round is finished.
9. Candidates of the group which obtains the majority of votes of citizens and at the same time the majority of votes of states are elected Chancellors of the Union. If no group of candidates obtains the majorities determined above, the group of candidates is elected which obtains the highest total of portion of votes of citizens and of portion of votes of states.
10. Details of the election is stipulated by the law.

Article 38 – Rights and duties of Chancellors of the Union
1. Nobody is allowed to be a member of the Assembly of the Union and to hold any constitutional or other salaried office of the European Union, of any member state or its autonomous entity or of any other territory of the Union.
2. A member of the Council of Chancellors may not be prosecuted, restricted in his free movement or arrested unless caught while committing a criminal act.
3. A member of the Council of Chancellors may be prosecuted in suspicion of committing a criminal act. At least 25 000 citizens of the Union from at least three member states or at least forty deputies of the House of People or at least twenty deputies of the House of States initiate criminal proceedings.
4. The members of the Council of Chancellors receive a salary paid from means of the Union. To receive other remunerations is inadmissible.
5. The mandate of a member of the Council of Chancellors becomes effective by his election.
6. Every member of the Council of Chancellors takes the oath at the first session of the Council of Chancellors. The oath of the member of the Assembly of the Union reads: “I, … (name of a person), solemnly pledge now to work for welfare of the people of the European Union, to represent it in compliance with my conscience and to fulfill the spirit of the constitution of the Union.”
8. The mandate of a member of the Assembly of the Union expires by
(a) expiration of the term of mandate,
(b) refusing to take the oath or taking the oath with reservations,
(c) resignation,
(d) death,
(e) exercise of an incompatible function,
(f) recall,
(g) imprisonment.
8. The law stipulates details of rights and duties of the members of the Council of Chancellors.

Article 39 – Vacant office of a Chancellor
1. If the office of the Chancellor of the Union becomes vacant, election of the Council of Chancellors is held according to the article 37 within 80 days.
2. Until the Council of Chancellors is elected, duties of an absent Chancellor of the Union exercise the President of the House of People of the Assembly of the Union, the President of the House of States of the Assembly of the Union and the President of the Supreme Court of the Union, in this order.
3. The law stipulates details.

Article 40 – First Chancellor
1. The period for which the Council of Chancellors was elected is divided in three equal parts. Every Chancellor is the First Chancellor in one term determined this way.
2. Order is decided by lot held in the joint session of both chambers of the Assembly of the Union chaired by the President of the House of People.

Article 41 – Sessions of the Council of Chancellors
1. The Council of Chancellors exercises laws of the Union, judgments of the Supreme Court of the Union or other courts of the Union and adopt measures necessary for common good of the Union in the frame of the laws of the Union.
2. Sessions of the Council of Chancellors take place in the Federal Region of Brussels, in the case of extraordinary circumstances in other place of the Union.
3. Sessions of the Council of Chancellors are closed unless the Council determines otherwise.
4. The First Chancellor of the Union, in urgent case other Chancellor of the Union calls and chairs sessions of the Council of Chancellors. Details are stipulated by the law.
5. Approval of at least two Chancellors of the Union is required to adopt a decision of the Council of Chancellors.
6. The Council of Chancellors charges the definite Chancellor of the Union with execution of its decision. The authorized Chancellor of the Union is entitled to issue necessary instructions exercising the decision of the Council of Chancellors.
7. The decision of the Council of Chancellors is inscribed  in the Official Journal of the European Union. It takes effect when it is inscribed in the Official Journal unless urgent necessity requires otherwise. Details are stipulated by the law.
8. Written minutes from each session of the Council of Chancellors must be taken. Their requisites are stipulated by the law.

Article 42 – External relations
1. The First Chancellor of the Union is the highest representative of the Union. He represents the Union internationally unless the Council of Chancellors decides otherwise.
2. The First Chancellor of the Union appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Union on the authority of the Council of Chancellors and receives foreign ambassadors.
3. The Council of Chancellors negotiates and ratifies international treaties. It continuously reports to the Assembly of the Union on progress of negotiation.

Article 43 – Armed forces of the Union
1. The First Chancellor of the Union is Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the Union.
2. The First Chancellor of the Union appoints, promotes, degrades and recalls high officers of the armed forces of the Union and decides upon committing armed forces of the Union.
3. Armed forces of the Union can be dispatched outside the territory of the Union and the associated states of the Union only with consent of the Assembly of the Union.
4. Military operations against an enemy can be done only after formal proclamation of war.
5. The Council of Chancellors can dispatch the armed forces of the Union outside the territory of the Union and the associated states without consent of the Assembly of the Union only for the purpose of averting an imminent military attack or effects of a great natural disaster and only for the time of fifty hours.